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REVIVING THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE DISTINCTION IN
FEMINIST THEORIZING
TRACY E. HIGGINS*
The dichotomy between the private and the public is central to
almost two centuries of feminist writing and political struggle; it is,
ultimately, what the feminist movement is about.
- Carole Pateman1
The public/private distinction has been a target of thoroughgoing
feminist critique for quite some time now. Indeed, attacking the
public/private line has been one of the primary concerns (if not the
primary concern) of feminist legal theorizing for over two decades. If
Carole Pateman is correct, one would think that this particular
problem might be assigned to the category of "finished business" by
this time. In this Essay, I do argue that the critique is, in certain ways,
finished business in that it is no longer particularly useful in its most
common forms. More importantly, however, I suggest several ways in
which various critiques of the public/private line have left much
business unfinished.
The line between public and private has at least two distinct
meanings within feminist theorizing. Feminists sometimes use the
concept to refer to the demarcation of a zone of personal privacy
protected from state regulation. This usage, in turn, has at least two
variations,2 sometimes referring to "decisional privacy," a concept
related to personal autonomy,3 and at other times referring to spatial
* I would like to thank the participants at faculty workshops at both the University of
Pennsylvania School of Law and at Fordham Law School who provided valuable insights and
suggestions. I would also like to thank the participants at the Cornell Law Review Symposium
in October 1999 who challenged me to think again about the significance of the public/private
distinction in feminist theorizing.
1. Carole Pateman, Feminist Critiques of the Public/Private Dichotomy, in PUBLIC AND
PRIVATE IN SOCIAL LIFE 281,281 (S. I. Benn & G. F. Gaus eds., 1983).
2. The categories can be usefully subdivided further, see Anita L. Allen, Coercing Privacy,
40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 723 (1999) (listing physical, informational, and proprietary privacy in
addition to decisional privacy); however, these two categories describe reasonably well the
scope of feminist concerns with privacy for my purposes.
3. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 25-26, 250-54 (1996) (justifying privacy by arguing that government
"must not dictate what its citizens think about matters of political or moral or ethical
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privacy, related to the sanctity of home and family,4 both of which
enjoy a degree of constitutional protection.5 In other contexts,
feminists use the concept of the public/private line to denote the
limits of the application of constitutional constraints. In this sense of
the term, actions falling on the public side of the line implicate the
constitution and those on the private side do not.6 Clearly the uses
are related; however, just as clearly they are not the same. The first
demarcates a constitutional limit on the reach of state action. The
second demarcates a state action limit on the reach of the
constitution.
In this Essay, I argue that feminist critiques of both uses of the
public/private distinction tend to overstate the threat the concepts
pose to women's liberty and equality and to understate or ignore
altogether the potential value of the distinction for feminist
theorizing. With respect to the first definition, the private as the
personal, this "meta-critique" is not particularly new. Liberal
feminists have always defended the value of privacy, and,
increasingly, other feminists are beginning to rethink its value in a
number of contexts.7 With respect to the second definition of the
public/private distinction, focusing on state action, feminists remain
remarkably unified in the deconstructive project.8 In this Essay, I
hope to raise a challenge to this unity and provoke a reexamination of
the public/private line, moving the critique from the category of
"foregone conclusion" to "unfinished business."
Part I of this Essay addresses critiques of the public/private line
that defines a zone of decisional or spatial privacy. First, Part I
briefly describes the most important of these critiques. It then
suggests that, notwithstanding assertions regarding the personal as
judgment"); James E. Fleming, Securing Deliberative Autonomy, 48 STAN. L. REv. 1, 2, 7-16
(1995) (formulating the right of privacy as deliberative autonomy).
4. See, e.g., MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL
FAMILY, AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 186-89 (1995) (discussing how the
common law concept of privacy focused on the entity of the family).
5. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), as reinterpreted by the Supreme Court in Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), perhaps best articulates the constitutional protection
of decisional autonomy. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965), emphasizes spatial
privacy in the form of the "sacred precincts of marital bedrooms." But see Bowers v. Hardwick,
478 U.S. 186 (1986) (rejecting the argument that the criminalization of sodomy violated
respondent's constitutional right to privacy in the bedroom).
6. See generally GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1478-1536 (1986).
7. See infra notes 30-45 and accompanying text.
& See infra notes 48-62 and accompanying text.
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political, most feminists, including the strongest critics of the
public/private line, find much that is worth preserving in the right of
privacy. Part II addresses critiques of the public/private line in the
second sense, as a limit on the scope of constitutional rights. Here
again, after briefly describing two important types of critiques, Part II
argues that neither of the critiques supports an elimination of the line
altogether. Acknowledging that the issue is reform and not
elimination of the distinction, Part III explores the utility of the
public/private line, particularly the differential constitutional
treatment of public and private power; suggests ways of refocusing
and refining the critique; and lays out an agenda for further
exploration.
I. PERSONAL PRIVACY
A. Personal Privacy- Traditional Conceptions and Feminist
Critiques
Historically, the line between the home as private and the rest of
civil and political society as public was defined by social norms as well
as law, and that line was clearly gendered.9 Legislative classifications
that excluded women from public activities ranging from lawyering 10
to bartending" to voting 2 reinforced the notion that women's proper
place was the private sphere of home and family.13 Although largely
premised on equality-based arguments, legal challenges to these
statutes may be understood as an early attack on the public/private
line in the sense that they called into question the notion that the
state could properly regulate women based on the assumption that
men and women were destined to occupy separate spheres. 4
9. See Anita L. Allen & Erin Mack, How Privacy Got Its Gender, 10 N. ILL. U. L. REV.
441 (1990) (discussing gendered images of privacy).
10. See Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873) (involving a challenge to Illinois'
practice of excluding women from the bar).
11. See Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) (rejecting an Equal Protection Clause
challenge to a Michigan statute restricting women's employment as bartenders).
12- See Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 171-73 (1875) (rejecting a Privileges
and Immunities Clause challenge to Missouri's gender-based restrictions on voting).
13. See, e.g., Bradwell, 83 U.S. at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring) (noting that "[tihe par-
amount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfil the noble and benign offices of wife and
mother").
14. For a review of the development of constitutional litigation regarding gender, see Tracy
E. Higgins, "By Reason of Their Sex": Feminist Theory, Postmodernism, and Justice, 80
CORNELL L. REV. 1536,1541-60 (1995).
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Eventually, beginning in the 1970s, the Supreme Court began to
strike down such legislation as violating the Equal Protection Clause,
gradually moving toward a norm of gender blindness. 15 As these
victories were won in the name of formal equality, feminists
increasingly focused on more subtle reasons for the persistence of
gender subordination, including issues that had not previously been
regarded as implicating equality concerns. Under this analysis, the
assault on separate spheres has given way to a different set of privacy
critiques focusing on ways the constitutional protection of personal or
family privacy insulates women within the private sphere even in the
absence of formal legal barriers."
These critiques have addressed privacy both as a protected space
encompassing home and family and as decisional autonomy.
Feminists have criticized both types of privacy rights as, at best,
inadequately ensuring privacy for women and, at worst, shielding
from public scrutiny private abuse of women.
With respect to spatial privacy, feminists have argued that a'
constitutionally-protected sphere of privacy shelters from state
regulation a domain in which women have unequal power and are
physically vulnerable. 7 Robin West has suggested that "if patriarchal
control of women's choices and patriarchal domination of women's
inner and public lives occur in the very private realm of home life[,J
then the Constitution, above all else, protects the very system of
15. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (striking down male-only
admissions policy at the Virginia Military Institute); J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127
(1994) (holding that gender-based peremptory challenges were unconstitutional); Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (striking down statute permitting girls to purchase alcohol at a
younger age than boys); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975) (striking down a statute
establishing a lower age of majority for females than for males); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411
U.S. 677 (1973) (striking down use of different standards to establish dependency of male and
female spouses); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (striking down a mandatory preference for
men over women in the administration of estates).
16. Though the theoretical analysis was newly emerging, the problem had deep historical
roots. See, e.g., State v. Rhodes, 61 N.C. (Phil. Law) 349, 353 (1868) ("We will not inflict upon
society the greater evil of raising the curtain upon domestic privacy, to punish the lesser evil of
trifling violence."); see also Reva B. Seigel, "The Rule of Love": Wife Beating as Prerogative and
Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117,2154-74 (1996).
17. See ROBIN WEST, PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM: RECONSTRUCrING THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 164, 165 (1994) (arguing that "at least a good deal of the time, in
the name of guaranteeing constitutional protection of individual freedom, [the Constitution]
also aggressively protects the very hierarchies of wealth, status, race, sexual preference, and
gender that facilitate those practices of subordination") (emphasis added); see also Catharine A.
MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L.J. 1281, 1311 (1991) (stating
that "the law's privacy is a sphere of sanctified isolation, impunity, and unaccountability").
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power and control that constrains us. '18 Acknowledging that women
may be victims of men's privacy, West and others have thus
characterized the protection of familial privacy as undermining rather
than enhancing women's liberty.19 To ensure women's equality and
security, therefore, the state must cross the private boundary of home
and family and regulate the distribution of power within that sphere.
With respect to privacy as decisional autonomy, feminists have
also attacked liberal definitions of privacy on the grounds that, by
equating liberty within the realm of the private with state
noninterference in that realm, the right of privacy undervalues private
inequality and overstates individual agency.20 This critique has at
least two distinct but related strands. The first and earliest strand
emphasizes women's position in relationship with others-women as
providers of care. According to this critique, liberal notions of
privacy (and somewhat more broadly of autonomy) posit an unrealis-
tically unencumbered individual, or "atomistic man."'z  Privacy
protects this atomistic individual in his pursuit of his own vision of the
good by freeing him from state intrusion or from the prying eyes of
the press.22 Yet, by positing the self as unencumbered or atomistic,
privacy as liberal autonomy regards the work of caring as voluntarily
assumed, private activity-in other words, as expressions of private
choice rather than limitations on or threats to privacy as autonomy.23
Thus, to the extent that the lives of most women are characterized by
attachment and relations of dependence rather than atomism, this
18. WEST, supra note 17, at 119.
19. See id. at 114-21; see also CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY
OF THE STATE 184-94 (1989) (offering a critique of the right of privacy as a foundation for
abortion rights).
20. See MacKinnon, supra note 17, at 1311 (arguing that "the doctrine of privacy has
become the triumph of the state's abdication of women in the name of freedom and self-
determination").
21. See Robin L. West, The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives: A Phenomenological
Critique of Feminist Legal Theory, 3 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 81 (1987); Robin West, Jurisprudence
and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1988).
22 See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
193, 195-97, 204-06 (1890).
23. See ROBIN WEST, CARING FOR JUSTICE (1997). West emphasizes the severe
consequences of this assumption for women. She warns:
The many women and the occasional man who define themselves as not-selves suffer a
decreased sense of personal autonomy, of independence, of individuation, and of
integrity. There is no reason to celebrate these stunted selves whose very existence is
dramatic evidence of massive societal injustice, by misconstruing the selflessness they
exemplify as the virtue of compassion.
Id. at 83.
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conception of privacy underprotects women relative to men.
This critique posits women as less capable of translating the
conditions guaranteed by traditional privacy into the values informing
privacy as autonomy. Taking into account this alternative conception
of the connected self, feminists have argued that an account of
privacy premised on women's experience would, at a minimum,
acknowledge that simply leaving the individual alone within this
relational web might not be sufficient to ensure privacy. From a
liberal standpoint, this view leads to a paradoxical conclusion-that
securing individual autonomy requires greater state regulation of the
sphere in which that autonomy is exercised.
The second, more recent, strand of the agency critique concerns
itself less with the constraints of relationship than with the more
diffuse and subtle constraints of culture. This critique begins from the
assumption that cultural norms, including language, law, custom, and
moral norms, are not merely products of human will and action but
define and limit the possibilities for human identity.24 Feminists have
argued that this social construction of identity is gender-
differentiated, contributing to women's subordination. Thus, feminist
social constructionists have been concerned not so much by the
liberal preoccupation of state limits on individuals (implying external
constraints) but by the way a combination of forces creates or defines
gendered individuals (implying both internal and external
constraints)5 If women are socially constructed in ways that afford
them less agency relative to men, then liberalism's tendency to regard
liberty as the absence of external constraints (or even more narrowly
the absence of state-sponsored external constraints) leaves women
less free than men in ways that are not legally cognizable. 26
Although this concept of internalized, socially-defined
constraints on women's identity has long been a part of feminist
24. See, e.g., JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF
IDENTTrY 2 (1990) (emphasizing social construction of identity and arguing that "feminist
critique ought also to understand how the category of 'women,' the subject of feminism, is
produced and restrained by the very structures of power through which emancipation is
sought").
25. See, e.g., Nancy J. Hirshmann, Toward a Feminist Theory of Freedom, 24 POL. THEORY
46, 51-52 (1996) (suggesting that patriarchal rules constitute "not only.., what women are
allowed to do but ... what they are allowed to be as well: how women are able to think and
conceive of themselves, what they can and should desire, what their preferences are").
26. See Tracy E. Higgins, Democracy and Feminism, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1657 (1997)
(making a related argument that internal constraints must be taken into account in any
adequate theory of women's citizenship within a democracy).
[Vol. 75:847
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theorizing,2 7 recent work on social construction theory by feminist
legal theorists in particular bears upon the question of freedom as it
relates to privacy. For example, Kathryn Abrams has developed a
theory of partial agency in the context of women's sexuality, which,
though not framed as a critique of privacy per se, has important
implications for any definition of privacy as decisional autonomy.
Abrams has argued for a feminist conception of the self that
"juxtapos[es] women's capacity for self-direction and resistance, on
the one hand, with often-internalized patriarchal constraint, on the
other."28 Premising legal analysis of private choice on this model of
individual agency, Abrams argues, would lead to better
interpretations of women's sexual decisionmaking-for example,
identifying coercion and consent in rape cases.29  Adopting the
approach, however, would also have implications for the boundary of
public and private in that it entails scrutiny of the circumstances and
internal motivations of private choices ordinarily shielded from view,
and invites a second-guessing of those choices that would narrow the
scope of women's decisional privacy, at least as traditionally defined.
B. Critiquing the Critique
The persistence of these critiques-often under the banner "the
personal is the political" - suggests that feminists have very little use
for the notion that the private sphere is worthy of protection from
government regulation or government scrutiny. This turns out not to
be the case. Indeed, some feminists have defended a liberal
conception all along. For example, both Anita Allen and Linda
McClain, among others, have consistently argued that a modified
liberal conception of privacy is central to women's liberty interests. 3°
27. Even a liberal theorist like Mary Wollstonecraft recognized the significance of social
constraints on gender roles. She wrote: "I will venture to affirm, that a girl, whose spirits have
not been damped by inactivity, or innocence tainted by false shame, will always be a romp, and
the doll will never excite attention unless confinement allows her no alternative." MARY
WOLLSTONECRAFI, A VINDICATION OF THE RIGHTS OF WOMAN. 43 (Carol H. Poston ed.,
W. W. Norton & Co. 1975) (1792).
28. Kathryn Abrams, Sex Wars Redux: Agency and Coercion in Feminist Legal Theory, 95
COLUM. L. REV. 304,346 (1995) (emphasis added).
29. See id. at 361-62.
30. See ANITA L. ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS: PRIVACY FOR WOMEN IN A FREE SOCIETY
(1988); Anita Allen, Privacy, in A COMPANION TO FEMINIST PHILOSOPHY 456 (Alison M.
Jaggar & Iris Marion Young eds., 1998) [hereinafter Allen, Privacy]; Anita L. Allen, The
Jurispolitics of Privacy, in RECONSTRUCTING POLITICAL THEORY: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES 68
(Mary Lyndon Shanley & Uma Narayan eds., 1997); Linda C. McClain, Inviolability and
Privacy: The Castle, the Sanctuary, and the Body, 7 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 195 (1995); Linda C.
2000]
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While taking feminist critiques of liberal privacy seriously, McClain
has challenged feminists to clarify and refine their arguments with
respect to the core concerns of privacy.31 She has made a compelling
case that decisional privacy is central to women's freedom and need
not unduly limit affirmative efforts by the state to secure women's
equality. 32 Anita Allen has advocated a liberal conception of privacy
that would simultaneously preserve those values served by a right of
privacy and respond to feminist critiques of traditional definitions of
both spatial and decisional privacy.33 Like McClain, Allen's theory of
privacy would not preclude state intervention in the private realm
where necessary to secure women's equality and security.34
But self-described liberals like Allen and McClain have been
skeptical all along of wholesale feminist attacks on the private sphere.
More telling for my argument are feminists who have been critical of
the traditional protections of the private and have engaged in the
project of deconstructing the public/private line, but who nonetheless
defend-either explicitly or implicitly -certain core values protected
by the right of privacy. For example, Martha Fineman has long
criticized assumptions about the family premised on both spatial and
autonomy-based definitions of privacy. For Fineman, viewing the
family as private, either because it represents the locus of intimate
association and personal relationships or because it is a voluntary
union of equals, misdescribes the modern family in ways that
disempower women. 35 More recently, however, Fineman has begun
to reexamine the usefulness of the right of privacy for women,
particularly for single mothers. 36  She has criticized the
McClain, The Poverty of Privacy?, 3 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 119 (1992); Linda C. McClain,
Reconstructive Tasks for a Liberal Feminist Conception of Privacy, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV.
759 (1999).
31. See, e.g., Linda C. McClain, "Atomistic Man" Revisited: Liberalism, Connection, and
Feminist Jurisprudence, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 1171 (1992) (challenging the feminist characteriza-
tion of the liberal self as atomistic and arguing that liberalism accounts sufficiently for values of
connection and responsibility).
32 See Linda C. McClain, Toleration, Autonomy, and Governmental Promotion of Good
Lives: Beyond "Empty" Toleration to Toleration as Respect, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 19 (1998).
33. See Allen, Privacy, supra note 30.
34. See, e.g., Allen, supra note 2 (arguing in favor of government intervention to limit the
voluntary surrender of privacy under some circumstances).
35. See, e.g., Martha Albertson Fineman, Societal Factors Affecting the Creation of Legal
Rules for Distribution of Property at Divorce, in AT THE BOUNDARIES OF LAW: FEMINISM AND
LEGAL THEORY 265, 265-79 (Martha Albertson Fineman & Nancy Sweet Thomadsen eds.,
1991).
36. See FINEMAN, supra note 4, at 177-200.
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"individualization" of the constitutional right of privacy as excluding
single mothers (and other nontraditional notions of intimate
association),'3 but at the same time has argued for the revival of the
common law protection of privacy for the family as an entity.3
Of course, this conception of the family entity as private, and
therefore shielded from government regulation, is precisely the
definition of privacy that has for so long been the target of feminist
critique. Fineman in no way argues for the revival of the definition of
privacy that shielded male violence in the home from public scrutiny;
however, she has begun to question feminists' wholesale rejection of
the concept. Her recent work suggests simply that the discredited
concept of familial privacy might be reconfigured to serve the
interests of women who have become increasingly vulnerable to state
regulation in many aspects of their lives.
Similarly, though less explicitly, Robin West's recent work offers
a qualification of her earlier critiques of privacy as well. As discussed
above, West has been an important critic of a conception of privacy
that insulates the domestic sphere and assumes the autonomy or
agency of individuals within that sphere. She has argued that
"[rielationships of care, untempered by the demands of justice,
resulting in the creation of injured, harmed, exhausted, compromised,
and self-loathing 'giving selves,' rather than in genuinely
compassionate and giving individuals, are ubiquitous in this society,
and it is far more often women than men who are injured by them. '39
Focusing on the negative effects of intimate relationships on
individual autonomy, this critique seems to sever entirely the link
between traditional definitions of privacy and liberty. West revives
this link, however, in her proposed solution to the compromised
private individual: she advocates a model of the self that accounts
fully for women's experience, acknowledging connection,
dependence, and caring, but validating caring only when it is the
product of legitimately motivated individual choice.4° This approach,
like Abrams' model of partial agency, entails a scrutiny of the private
that extends beyond traditional boundaries. Nevertheless, it
37. See id. at 180-86.
3A See id. at 186-93.
39. WEST, supra note 23, at 81; see also Linda C. McClain, The Liberal Future of Relational
Feminism: Robin West's Caring for Justice, 24 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 477 (1999) (reviewing
West's book and characterizing West's proposal as a turn to liberalism).
40. WEST, supra note 23, at 88-93.
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represents a strong reaffirmation of the value of privacy as autonomy
for women.
Finally, Catharine MacKinnon, one of the most steadfast and
longstanding feminist critics of privacy, can also be read as rejecting a
particular formulation of the right of privacy without rejecting the
central values it purports to protect. For example, MacKinnon has
offered a powerful critique of privacy as the basis for women's right
to abortion.4 1 She has argued that women's private inequality means
that women are unable to control fully their sexual availability and, in
this sense, have no real privacy. 42 Moreover, this gap in women's
privacy is entirely ignored by constitutional privacy doctrine .4 At the
same time, defining privacy as nonintervention by the state in
reproductive decisions means giving (some) women access to
abortion and thereby increasing men's sexual access to women by
removing one consequence to that access-unintended pregnancy. 44
Thus, privacy doctrine perfectly serves men's interests.
This critique, however, does not diminish-indeed it is premised
on -the importance of sexual self-determination for women, a critical
aspect of privacy for women. Though imperfectly protected under
existing doctrine, this value is at the center of MacKinnon's argument
for an equality-based theory for abortion rights. 45  Although
MacKinnon prefers the language of equality, perhaps because it
makes gender subordination central to the analysis, the substantive
value in the equation is autonomy-or privacy. Her argument reveals
simultaneously how women's lack of autonomy contributes to their
inequality and their unequal power leaves their autonomy unrealized.
Even under MacKinnon's equality-based analysis, women's
subordination must be addressed in part through the
reconceptualization of privacy to ensure women's sexual autonomy
relative to men.
None of this is to suggest that feminist critiques of privacy have
been misdirected or counterproductive. On the contrary, they have
41. See MACKINNON, supra note 19, at 190-92.
42. See id.
43. See id.
44. See id.
45. See MacKinnon, supra note 17.
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powerfully reshaped thinking about privacy doctrine on both the
common law and constitutional level. This success, in turn, seems to
have created some space for a qualified reexamination of the uses of
privacy for women. The same cannot be said, however, for the
second use of the public/private distinction, denoting a state action
limit to the constitution's reach. It is to that set of critiques that I turn
in Part II.
II. STATE ACTION AND PRIVATE POWER
A. Two Types of Feminist Critiques
The second conception of the public/private line that has been a
target of feminist critique is that in which the line denotes the scope
of the constitutionally relevant exercise of power. As Frank
Michelman has explained, the public/private distinction, in this sense,
means that "although someone may have suffered harmful treatment
of a kind that one might ordinarily describe as a deprivation of
liberty.., that occurrence excites no constitutional concern unless the
proximate active perpetrators of the harm include persons exercising
the special authority or power of the government of a state." 46 Here
the state action doctrine defines the public/private boundary.
As with the first definition of the public/private distinction, much
ink has been spilled by scholars attacking, defending, defining, and
redefining this line.47 Here again, the feminist ink has largely focused
on two types of critiques. The first emphasizes the state in the state
action requirement and takes up the legal realist challenge to a
formalist emphasis on state power as opposed to private power. The
second emphasizes the action in the state action requirement and
argues that the negative formulation of constitutional constraints
leaves states unaccountable for their inaction, thereby reinforcing the
scope of private power.
As to the first, feminists, like legal realists before them, have
criticized the focus on state action as the touchstone for constitutional
46. Frank I. Michelman, Conceptions of Democracy in American Constitutional Argument.
The Case of Pornography Regulation, 56 TENN. L. REV. 291,306 (1989).
47. See, e.g., Symposium on the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1289 (1982);
Symposium, Mediating Institutions: Beyond the Public/Private Distinction, 61 U. CHI. L. REV.
1213 (1994), and countless individual articles. For a summary of feminist critiques, see Ruth
Gavison, Feminism and the Public/Private Distinction, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1992).
20001
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
constraints. 4 According to the familiar realist critique, the exercise of
private rights involves the exercise of power, not always (and
certainly not exclusively) the exercise of free choice. Focusing on
unequal economic power, realists argued, for example, that
contractual relations were better understood as coercive rather than
voluntary.4 9 Translating this critique of power to the realm of
constitutional interpretation, realists argued (with only very limited
doctrinal success) that under some circumstances private entities and
actions were functionally equivalent to public ones and should be
regarded constitutionally as such. 50
Feminists have taken this critique several steps further to argue
that the exercise of private power threatens constitutional values such
as liberty and equality, regardless of whether it mimics the exercise of
power by the state. Private entities need not be the functional
equivalent of public entities in order to implicate foundational
concerns about women's liberty. This point is, of course, central to
the feminist critiques of personal privacy already discussed, but
feminists have also raised the argument as a direct attack on the state
action concept. For example, feminists have argued that international
human rights standards that forbid torture but regard domestic
violence as outside the scope of international concern fail to address
the central source of violent coercion in women's lives on a global
scale.51 The argument is not that the abusive husband acts under
color of state law or to promote the interests of the state.5 2 Rather,
the argument is simply that a meaningful right to freedom, bodily
48. For representative examples of realist critiques, see KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE
COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 3-18, 393 (1960); L. L. Fuller, American Legal
Realism, 82 U. PA. L. REv. 429, 435-38 (1934); and Mark Tushnet, Post-Realist Legal
Scholarship, 1980 WIS. L. REv. 1383, 1384-88.
49. See Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM.
L. REv. 809 (1935).
50. See, e.g., Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (subjecting a company town to the
federal government's First Amendment obligation to allow religious proselytizers access to its
"public" spaces, despite the technically private status of the town); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S.
1 (1948) (holding that judicial enforcement of racially-restrictive covenants violated the Equal
Protection Clause despite the fact that the covenants were themselves private agreements).
51. See, e.g., Charlotte Bunch, Transforming Human Rights from a Feminist Perspective, in
WOMEN'S RIGHTS HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES 11 (Julie Peters
& Andrea Wolper eds., 1995).
52. Though sometimes "private" violence does function in these ways. See Catharine A.
MacKinnon, Crimes of War, Crimes of Peace, in ON HUMAN RIGHTS: THE OXFORD AMNESTY
LEcrURES 83 (Stephen Shute & Susan Hurley eds., 1993). Moreover, emphasizing the
regulatory effects of private violence is not to suggest the state is unimplicated in such violence.
See infra at p. 862.
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integrity, and security for women must include effective remedies
against private violence. 53
Feminists have made similar arguments in many other contexts
ranging from pornography's silencing of women's speech 54 to the
regulatory effects of stranger violence on women's lives.55 The critical
claim that emerges from all of these examples is that the principal
threat to women's liberty and equality comes not from public power
but from private power.56 Although women are surely protected in
certain respects by constraints on public power, these protections do
not afford women the same degree of liberty and equality as men nor
do they address the most profound obstacles to equal citizenship for
women.57
The second type of critique, emphasizing the action component
of the state action doctrine, in some ways supplements the first. The
argument goes like this: It is bad enough that only state action and
not private action is considered relevant to the question of whether
one's liberty or equality has been violated. It is even worse that a
state's systematic failure to respond to abuses of private power will
rarely, if ever, implicate constitutional concerns. Moreover, because
state action is constitutionally relevant while private action is not,
state efforts to intervene in the existing balance of power in the
private sphere are viewed as unconstitutional violations of the rights
of the powerful rather than an effort to balance or regulate conflicting
53. See Bunch, supra note 51, at 13-14 (arguing that states must be held accountable for
sustaining conditions that enhance women's vulnerability to private violence).
54. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND
LAW 195 (1987) (noting that the Constitution's approach to free speech "tends to presuppose
that whole segments of the population are not systematically silenced socially, prior to
government action"); Michelman, supra note 46, at 294-95 (invoking feminist arguments
regarding the silencing effects of pornography to analyze Judge Easterbrook's opinion in
American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 328-29 (7th. Cir. 1985)).
55. See WEST, supra note 17, at 58 (using the marital rape exemption to argue for an
interpretation of equal protection as targeting the denial of the state's protection to some of its
citizens from private violence, aggression, and wrongdoing).
56. Indeed, Catharine MacKinnon argues that private not state power serves as the
foundation to women's inequality:
Unlike the ways in which men systematically enslave, violate, dehumanize, and
exterminate other men, expressing political inequalities among men, men's forms of
dominance over women have been accomplished socially as well as economically, prior
to the operation of law, without express state acts, often in intimate contexts, as
everyday life.
MACKINNON, supra note 19, at 161.
57. See Higgins, supra note 26, at 1694-99 (applying the argument from private violence to
an analysis of equal citizenship for women).
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rights.5 8
Here again, examples abound. State-sponsored affirmative
action programs violate the rights of innocent whites unless they
directly and narrowly respond to state action violating the rights of
minorities.5 9 State action on the basis of racial categories is the only
constitutionally meaningful act. Advantages whites enjoy because of
societal discrimination are not relevant to the equation.6° Campaign
finance reform violates the speech rights of wealthy donors, distorting
the political marketplace of ideas. 61 The disproportionate voice of the
wealthy within that marketplace is not constitutionally relevant.
Similarly, though more controversially, the regulation of
pornographers violates their First Amendment rights, though the
regulation of women's speech by pornographers is again
constitutionally irrelevant. 62
B. Limitations and Qualifications
Unlike the first set of privacy critiques involving the private
sphere of home and family, this second set of critiques involving state
action has yielded very few (if any) feminist dissenters.6 3 It is easy to
see why. The deconstruction of the public/private dichotomy is
58. MacKinnon deployed this argument quite effectively in her critique of the prevailing
legal conception of equality. She explained that "in the view that equates differentiation with
discrimination, changing an unequal status quo is discrimination, but allowing it to exist is not."
MACKINNON, supra note 54, at 42.
59. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (holding that "all
governmental action based on race-a group classification long recognized as 'in most
circumstances irrelevant and therefore prohibited'-should be subjected to detailed judicial
inquiry to ensure that the personal right to equal protection of the law has not been infringed")
(citation omitted).
60. See, e.g., Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (rejecting societal
discrimination as a basis for affirmative action); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 657 (1993)
(warning that "[r]acial gerrymandering, even for remedial purposes, may balkanize us into
competing racial factions") (emphasis added).
61. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
62. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, ONLY WoRDs 75-78 (1993); cf. Michelman, supra
note 46, at 295 (noting that Judge Easterbrook in American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771
F.2d 323, 328-29 (7th. Cir. 1985), adopted MacKinnon's theory regarding the impact of
pornography on women's speech as a basis for state regulation).
63. A recent experience served to demonstrate to me the centrality of the critique to
feminist orthodoxy. After presenting a related argument at a symposium at Cornell Law School
in which I suggested the usefulness of the public/private distinction in certain contexts, I was
warned repeatedly that the argument could be put to dangerous uses. It was as if feminists had
somehow succeeded in persuading a reluctant Court to embrace our view and that to question
that view now would undo all that hard work. See Tracy Higgins & Laura Rosenbury, Equality,
Anti-Discrimination Law, and the Liberal State, CORNELL L. REv. (forthcoming 2000).
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elegant and powerful and addresses (albeit at a fairly abstract level) a
broad range of feminist concerns. It exposes the way an apparently
neutral concept like state action operates to entrench existing
hierarchies of private power while simultaneously reinforcing the
equation of private action with freedom. At the same time, the
critique has yielded very few concrete results. The Supreme Court
has adhered steadfastly to the state action doctrine64 and has shown
little inclination to expand the set of circumstances under which
either private action or public inaction might be constitutionally
relevant.65  Ironically, this entrenchment of the public/private
dichotomy has relieved feminist critics of the need to consider more
precisely the implications of eliminating the distinction altogether.
Nevertheless, doing so might reveal reasons for maintaining the
distinction for certain purposes as well as strengthen existing critiques
by making them more precise.
III. PUBLIC AND PRIVATE POWER-MAINTAINING THE
DISTINCTION
In this section, I offer three reasons feminists may want to
reconsider our wholesale rejection of the public/private dichotomy in
the state action context. At the end of the section, I return briefly to
the first type of privacy critique in an effort to link together my
agenda for addressing unfinished business.
A. Descriptive Differences
The first and simplest reason for maintaining the public/private
distinction for certain purposes is that it may actually capture a
difference that is meaningful to women's experiences. For example,
consider the critique of the emphasis on state action in the context of
64. For example, in Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., the Supreme Court stated:
Careful adherence to the "state action" requirement preserves an area of individual
freedom by limiting the reach of federal law and federal judicial power.... A major
consequence is to require the courts to respect the limits of their own power as
directed against... private interests. Whether this is good or bad policy, it is a
fundamental fact of our political order.
457 U.S. 922, 936-37 (1982).
65. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989) (rejecting
the argument that the state, through its system of child protective services, had insulated a child
to the degree that the state should bear responsibility for its inaction or failure to intervene in
severe child abuse).
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international human rights.66 Although it is certainly correct that a
human rights regime that focuses exclusively on harms directly
perpetrated by the state fails to address important threats to women's
lives and liberty, it may also be correct that state sponsored violence
is qualitatively different from private violence. This view is consistent
with the reports of victims of human rights abuses. 67 Acts of private
violence indisputably have an impact on the lives of individual victims
that may include profound and long-lasting physical and
psychological consequences. 68 When rape and torture are perpetrated
by soldiers or police, however, those physical and psychological
consequences are compounded by political powerlessness and
vulnerability that often extend beyond the individual to the broader
community.69 This distinction may justify different approaches to
regulating the harm, including different theories of state
responsibility.70
This defense of the public/private line requires some immediate
qualifications. First, the difference I describe does not track perfectly
the contours of public and private action. Certain forms of private
violence such as that based on racial or religious hatred can have a
collective, political impact comparable to state-sponsored violence.71
To the extent that it does, it ought to be viewed as implicating the
66. See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
67. See, e.g., Tracy E. Higgins et al., Justice on Trial: State Security Courts, Police Impunity,
and the Intimidation of Human Rights Defenders in Turkey, 22 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 2129 (1999)
(describing the effects of state-sponsored rape and torture as reported by victims and linking
such effects to the political community).
6& See MARGARET T. GORDON & STEPHANIE RIGER, THE FEMALE FEAR (1989)
(analyzing the effects and costs of female fear of rape); Judith V. Becker & Meg S. Kaplan,
Rape Victims: Issues, Theories, and Treatment, 2 ANN. REV. SEX RES. 267 (1991) (discussing
psychological and physical consequences of rape); Deborah W. Denno, Panel Discussion: Men,
Women and Rape, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 125,127-33 (1994) (arguing that rape is a unique crime
due to the shame, stigma, and resulting psychological harm).
69. See, e.g., Vera Folnegovic-Smalc, Psychiatric Aspects of the Rapes in the War Against
the Republics of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, in MASS RAPE: THE WAR AGAINST WOMEN
IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA 174-79 (Alexandra Stiglmayer ed., 1994) (describing psychological
impact of rape in ethnic conflict); Ruth Seifert, War and Rape: A Preliminary Analysis, in MASS
RAPE: THE WAR AGAINST WOMEN IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA, supra, 54-72 (describing the
function of rape in ethic conflict).
70. Even Catharine MacKinnon, one of the strongest feminist critics of the public/private
dichotomy, invokes it in her work on rape as a war crime in Bosnia. See MacKinnon, supra note
52, at 88-89.
71. See Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 413, 467-76
(1999) (discussing the deterrence theories underlying enhanced penalties for hate-motivated
crimes). See generally JAMES B. JACOBS & KIMBERLY POTTER, HATE CRIMES: CRIMINAL
LAW & IDENTITY POLmcs 29 (1998) (discussing theories of harm and punishment in the
context of crimes motivated by identity-based hatred).
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allocation of political power in a way that affects the public sphere.72
Second, private violence that is pervasive and without legal remedy
contributes to political oppression in a way that is increasingly and
appropriately regarded as implicating the state.73  Finally,
acknowledging the existence of a qualitative difference between
private and state-sponsored violence does not lead to the conclusion
that one matters while the other does not. The feminist
deconstruction of the distinction between public and private violence
responds to the tendency to ignore or downplay the private.
However, one need not collapse the categories analytically to argue
that both should be taken seriously. Indeed, maintaining the
distinction may prove useful for the purposes of understanding the
nature of the harm and developing appropriate responses both on the
individual and the policy level.
B. Theoretical Distinctions
A second reason why feminists should consider working within
the public/private dichotomy and perhaps reshaping it is that a
distinction between public and private is implicit within the
theoretical critique itself. Specifically, the first critique-that the
public/private dichotomy inappropriately restricts state but not
private action-is almost always an argument for the greater
regulation of the private action viewed as harmful.74 Similarly, the
second critique-that the public/private dichotomy emphasizes action
and ignores inaction-is almost always an argument for the exercise
of public power (or location of a constitutional obligation to act) as a
72. This exception in some ways proves the rule in that the prevention of racially or
ethnically motivated violence has long been regarded as an important human rights obligation
of states. See, e.g., International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, art. 4(a), 660 U.N.T.S 195 (entered into force Nov. 20, 1994) (requiring states to
criminalize "all acts of violence or incitement to such acts against any race or group of persons
of another colour or ethnic origin").
73. This view is increasingly reflected in international human rights documents, particularly
with respect to the issue of violence against women. See, e.g., Vienna Declaration and
Programme of Action, adopted by the United Nations World Conference on Human Rights,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 157/24 (Part I) (1993) (providing that "[glender-based violence and all
forms of sexual harassment and exploitation, including those resulting from cultural prejudice
and international trafficking, are incompatible with the dignity and worth of the human person,
and must be eliminated"); Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.
177/20 (1995) (providing that "[g]overnments should take urgent action to combat and eliminate
all forms of violence against women in private and public life, whether perpetrated or tolerated
by the State or private persons").
74. See supra notes 51-57 and accompanying text.
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check on private power.75 This argument is advanced only so far by
collapsing public and private power and regarding them as equally
threatening to individual liberty. Indeed, a much more powerful
argument can be made that, given the differences between public and
private power, there are good reasons to prefer the exercise of public
power over the default allocation of private power in the face of
competing liberty or privacy concerns.
For example, Frank Michelman has argued that
[a] confirmed optimist about the deliberative character of popular
political action would tend to see the regulatory alternative to
private or market oppression as at least somewhat more likely to be
considerate of all the interests involved, not least including people's
interest in preventing the accretion of totalitarian, citizen-shaping
power by any social agency-the government among others.76
On this view, the exercise of public power through the institutions of
deliberative democracy should cut in favor of rather than against its
legitimacy. This move reverses the presumption of the state action
doctrine, which regards state, not private, action as the greater threat.
This is not to say that, categorically, state action should be
regarded as legitimate and private action suspect. It would be a
mistake for feminists to underestimate the very real threat posed by
tyranny of the majority by focusing our attention only on the
consequences of private power and the virtues of public power.
Feminists need no reminder that women's equality has been and
continues to be threatened by the exercise of public power. Yet,
maintaining the distinction does not require choosing sides in a
categorical way. The point is not simply to favor one form of power
over the other but to recognize their differences and to theorize more
carefully about the kind of threats each may pose.
At a minimum, arguments that begin from a recognition of both
the threat of private power and the democratic legitimacy of public
power may help tip the balance in favor of state intervention when
conflicting claims to liberty or equality are involved. For example,
policies such as affirmative action or hate speech regulation that are
designed to enhance equality by altering the private allocation of
resources may be characterized as encroaching on individual liberty.n
75. See supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text.
76. Michelman, supra note 46, at 315.
77. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (involving an equal
protection challenge by a white male contractor to a federal affirmative action program
benefiting minorities and women); City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989)
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The Supreme Court has frequently resolved the conflict between
equality and liberty (or competing equality claims) in favor of the
status quo and against government intervention.78 Yet, if the exercise
of public power carries with it the legitimacy of deliberative
democracy, it is difficult to see why the preexisting private allocation
of power should be favored.
C. Instrumental Assessments
Finally, there are practical reasons for maintaining the
public/private distinction in feminist theorizing. Michelman
articulates the view of a "confirmed optimist" about the democratic
process. 79 I suggest that his view of public power might also be
appealing to the confirmed feminist, not only for theoretical but also
for instrumental reasons. I suggest as much simply because there are
good reasons to believe that women may have greater access to public
power than to private power. Because women are a majority of the
population, in a well-functioning democracy one would expect that
women's interests would be well reflected in the legislative process.
Yet, owing to the exclusion of women from the political realm, both
de jure and de facto, women have never exercised as much political
power as is their due. Nevertheless, even before women were entitled
to vote, they were often successful at influencing legislative bodies.
For example, married women gained property rights through
legislative change before women could vote.80 Later, women achieved
income support for widows and workplace protections through
legislative means.8' More recently, women have won changes in rape
statutes,82 child support standards, and child support enforcement. 83
(involving an equal protection challenge by a white business owner to an affirmative action plan
designed to benefit minority-owned businesses).
7& See Adarand Constructors, 515 U.S. at 236-37 (adopting strict scrutiny standard and
remanding the case); Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 965 F. Supp. 1556 (D. Colo. 1997)
(granting summary judgment in favor of white contractor); J. A. Croson, 488 U.S. at 469
(plurality opinion) (affirming Fourth Circuit's decision to strike down program under strict
scrutiny standard).
79. Michelman, supra note 46, at 315.
80. See Richard H. Chused, Married Women's Property Law: 1800-1850, 71 GEO. L.J. 1359,
1398 (1983); MARYLYNN SALMON, WOMEN AND THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN EARLY AMERICA,
81-86,97-100 (1986).
81. See ELEANOR FLEXNER, CENTURY OF STRUGGLE: THE WOMEN'S RIGHTS
MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 208-21 (rev. ed. 1975); THEDA SKOCPOL, PROTECTING
SOLDIERS AND MOTHERS: THE POLITICAL ORIGINS OF SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED
STATES 373-74, 424-28 (1992).
82 See SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 80-91 (1987) (discussing changes in the legal
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During the last decade, Congress has passed two important pieces of
legislation protecting women's rights: the Family and Medical Leave
Act84 and the Violence Against Women Act.85
On the other hand, the democratic process has also generated
legislation that is profoundly harmful to women's interests.
Nineteenth-century statutes criminalizing abortion are one example. 86
Today, states continue to restrict access to abortion in a variety of
ways. On the federal level, welfare reform legislation passed during
the Clinton Administration has had devastating effects on poor
women. s7 Nevertheless, even acknowledging that women's power in
the public sphere is limited, one might argue that, to the extent that
women are more equal participants in the public than in the private
sphere, their interests are served in general by the broader exercise of
public power. Roe v. Wade notwithstanding, the most important
advances in women's rights have come through the exercise of
legislative power rather than the exercise of judicial review in the
name of privacy. Moreover, judicial review exercised in the name of
individual liberty, equality, or, more recently, federalism has become
an increasingly potent weapon in the hands of those who also wield
private power. The challenge for feminists is therefore to develop
and deploy arguments that will, at a minimum, help to balance this
private power through democratic means.
CONCLUSION
In a sense, the reexamination of the distinction between public
and private power proposed in this Essay is simply a call for more
extensive feminist theorizing about the role of the state. Feminists
definition of rape and standards for determining consent).
83. See HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES, 734-43 (2d ed. 1987) (discussing Congressional efforts to make child support
prospectively enforceable through wage withholding).
84. Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C §§ 2601-2654 (1994).
85. Violence Against Women Act, 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994). But see United States v.
Morrison, Nos. 99-5, 99-29, 2000 WL 574361 (U.S. May 15, 2000) (striking down portions of the
Violence Against Women Act as exceeding Congress' power under both the Commerce Clause
and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment).
86. By 1900, every state had laws banning abortions, and many imposed criminal sanctions.
See KRISTIN LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD 15 (1984).
87. See Randy Albelda, Off the Welfare Rolls to Where? The Luckiest Join the Uncared-for,
Benefit-less Working Poor, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 22, 1998, at E3; see also Dorothy E. Roberts,
The Only Good Poor Woman, 72 DENV. U. L. REv. 931 (1995) (discussing the impact of the
welfare reform legislation's family cap on poor women's reproductive rights).
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must move beyond a critique of the liberal framework of state power
limited by individual rights to a thorough reconceptualization of the
relationship among individual freedom, private power, and the state.
This project has already begun in the feminist theorizing about
personal privacy described in the first part of this Essay. Having
revealed the ways in which traditional conceptions of privacy are
either inadequate for or affirmatively harmful to women, feminists
have begun to reimagine privacy rights in a way that might more fully
realize for women the values informing liberal privacy. 88 Significantly,
much of this work on privacy does not track the traditional
public/private boundary but instead entails affirmative state
intervention in the private sphere to alter the allocation of private
power.
Although this work represents an important beginning, the
business is unfinished. Feminists need to expand the project to
encompass broader questions of the proper role of state power. What
constitutes a legitimate exercise of state power within a well-
functioning deliberative democracy? How should individual rights be
defined against state and private power? What are the affirmative
obligations of the state to intervene in the allocation and exercise of
private power? How can power be allocated among institutions, both
public and private, to enhance simultaneously individual liberty and
equality? Bearing in mind these large questions will help to move
feminist theorizing beyond a critique bounded by traditional notions
of public and private and toward a possible transformation of the
roles of public and private power in ensuring women's liberty and
equality.
88. See supra notes 30-45 and accompanying text.
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